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RECAP: Cloud Peak Energy v. State Department of Revenue: Finding 
an “Apples to Apples” Comparison For the Market Value of Coal in 




No. DA 14-0057 
 
Montana Supreme Court  
 
Oral Argument: Tuesday, November 25, 2014 at 9:30 a.m. in the 
Courtroom of the Montana Supreme Court, Joseph P. Mazurek Justice 
Building, Helena, Montana. The matter was taken into advisement at 
about 10:45 a.m.  
 
I. BRENDEN R. BEATTY FOR THE PETITIONER 
  
Brendan Beatty began his argument by encouraging the court to 
focus on three seemingly simple words “time of sale.” Beatty argued the 
time of sale of coal in Montana, is when the coal is severed from the 
earth and placed onto a railcar f.o.b. mine.1 He argues this is the 
appropriate time to approximate market value for imputation of revenue 
purposes. Beatty asked the Court not to muddle through in the extensive 
briefing and facts involved in the case, but rather vi w the issue as a 
matter of law and decide the term “time of sale,” as contemplated in 
Decker Coal Company v. Department of Revenue,2 to be when coal is 
prepared for shipment.  
Several Justices sought clarification from Beatty on what point 
the price of coal is actually set, as they seemed to believe the price is set 
at the time of contract rather than at the time the coal is loaded onto the 
train. Beatty agreed, and explained the base price is s t when an arm’s 
length contract is entered into, but the value is adjusted for additives and 
thus the exact price is not known until the transfer at the railcar occurs. 
Then Justice Shea explained the Court’s “bottom line” is to find a 
methodology which “compares apples to apples.” He pointed out it 
seemed the Department’s favored methodology, which compares actual 
sales prices, as opposed to negotiated arm’s length agreement prices, to 
determine market value of NAL agreements, would result in “inevitable 
disparity.” While Beatty conceded the Department’s method may result 
in a disparity in some instances, he argued that issue was one for the 
legislature to decide. 
                                         
1 Oral Argument Audiofile, Cloud Peak Energy v. State Department of Revenue, (Mont. Sept. 26, 
2014)(No. DA 14-0057).  
2 Decker Coal Co. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 2 P.3d 245 (Mont. 2000).  
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Before changing gears to address the cross appeal issue, Beatty 
addressed what the Department sees as a possible evl of Clod Peak 
Energy’s (“CPE”) interpretation. He argued, if the Court adopted CPE’s 
interpretation, CPE could enter into artificially low contracts, by waiting 
until the “bottom falls out of the coal market and arm’s length 
transactions are lower.” At this time, he argued, CPE could lock-in a low 
arm’s length market price for the company’s NAL contracts. He argued 
the Department’s method would prevent these “suspect transactions.” 
Beatty concluded on this issue by driving home the point he made in the 
beginning of his time, arguing the Montana Supreme Court has already 
decided coal is sold when it is extracted and prepared for shipment f.o.b 
mine, not when a piece of paper (agreement) is signed.  
Pivoting to respond to CPE’s cross appeal on additives, Beatty 
argued the administrative rule cited by the Respondent which eliminated 
a reference to “further processing” only applied to refined coal, which is 
not at issue here. He also argued the District Court was correct in 
determining the statute merely clarified the Department’s existing 
practice of including other costs as part of the coal’s value and the 
“prepared for shipment” language in the old statute meant the values for 
additives should be included in the price.  
 
II.  KYLE ANN GRAY FOR THE RESPONDENT 
 
Kyle Gray began her argument explaining a rule of construction 
applied to tax statutes: when there is doubt in the meaning of a tax 
statute, the doubt is resolved in favor of the taxpayer and strictly 
construed against the Department. Gray distinguished t is statutory rule 
of construction from the burden of proof CPE carries as the contesting 
party, which she argues was met in Judge Sherlock’s District Court.  
Gray then suggested the Department was “dancing around the 
holding” in Decker Coal Company, pointing out the dissent in that case 
actually concluded the sale occurred when coal was loaded onto the train.  
Quoting Justice Shea, Gray argued, the Court must “compare apples to 
apples,” and adopting the Department’s interpretation, gnores the fact 
that coal is an interchangeable commodity in the sense that one train car 
may contain coal from numerous contracts, entered into at different 
times, with different prices. Gray argued using market price at time of 
shipping, rather than the price of negotiated arm’s length contracts when 
determining the price for NAL contracts is like comparing “apples to 
bananas.” Pointing out the statutory language does n t include “time of 
sale,” but rather instructs the Department to find “market value,” Gray 
assured the Court the most logical, relevant way to determine a NAL 
contract’s market value is to use contemporaneous negotiated arm’s 
length contracts. She argued this method makes sense because that is 
when the market forces are the same for both types of contracts. 
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Toward the end of her argument, Gray was asked to adress the 
possible evil Beatty brought up in his argument—CPE’s ability to 
artificially manipulate the price of coal by renegotiating NAL 
agreements when the market has “bottomed out.” Gray responded by 
saying she “never understood that argument” because it assumes CPE 
would keep its prices low and take less than what it could get for coal in 
arm’s length transactions. 
Before moving onto the additives issue on cross appe l, Gray 
argued where there is a NAL contract for coal the Dpartment must 
impute the market value f.o.b. mine. To do that, and chieve an “apples 
to apples comparison,” she argues the Department cannot ignore the 
most relevant comparison—the time of sale comparison which is the 
arm’s length negotiated contract.  
Addressing CPE’s cross appeal, Gray argued the legislature’s 
purpose in amending the statute at issue3 was to clarify an inconsistently 
applied Department practice and since the statute was applied 
inconsistently the pre-2009 statute should be construed in favor of the 
taxpayer. Before running out of time, Gray stressed that by interpreting 
the earlier version of the statute as containing langu ge only present in 
the 2009 amended version, the Court would essentially be writing out the 
statute’s applicability date.  
 
III.  PREDICTION 
 
Both interpretations of the statute have obvious merits, making 
the Justices’ decision difficult. However, in trying to find an “apples to 
apples comparison” for market value of NAL contracts, the Justices 
seemed persuaded by Respondent’s arguments for utilizing 
contemporaneous arm’s length sales contracts. On the additives issue, the 
Justices seemed persuaded the words “prepared for shipment” in the 
previous statute’s language should be given meaning, a d thus the value 
of additives should be included in price. This author predicts the Court 
will affirm the District Court’s ruling on both issues.  
 
 
Lower Court: Lewis and Clark County Cause No. BDV201 -239, 
Honorable Jeffery M. Sherlock, District Court Judge of the First Judicial 
District, Lewis and Clark County. 
 
Attorneys for the Petitioner: Brendan R. Beatty and Courtney Jenkins, 
Special Assistant Attorneys General, Montana Departmen  of Revenue. 
 
                                         
3 See Mont. Code Ann. § 15–35–102 (2013).  
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Attorneys for the Respondent: Robert L. Sterup and Kyle Anne Gray, 
Holland & Hart L.L.P., Billings, Montana. 
 
 
